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acknowledged. Errors are the responsibility of the authors.Abstract: This paper considers a dynamic matching model with imper-
fectly observable worker e®ort, combining the matching technology of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) with the shirking problem of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
We characterize the equilibrium and propose a quick algorithm for computing
it to arbitrary accuracy.
In our economy, the no-shirking condition endogenously imposes real down-
ward wage rigidity on the matching market. This type of wage rigidity implies
that ine±cient separations occur, as in Ramey and Watson (1997). Nonethe-
less, our main numerical ¯nding is that imperfectly observable e®ort smoothes
job destruction over the cycle, because ¯rms are forced, in good states, to
terminate some marginal jobs which they cannot commit to maintain in bad
states. This time-inconsistency problem casts doubt on the importance of inef-
¯cient churning ("contractual fragility") as an explanation of observed employ-
ment °uctuation. On the other hand, the no-shirking condition implies that
¯rms' share of surplus is procyclical, which can amplify °uctuations in job
creation. Thus, our model is consistent with recent evidence that job creation
is more important than job destruction in driving labor market °uctuations,
and it therefore also tends to generate a robust Beveridge curve. However, the
overall impact on unemployment and vacancy volatility is ambiguous.
JEL classi¯cation: C78, E24, E32, J64
Keywords: Job matching, wage rigidity, e±ciency wages, contractual
fragility
11 Introduction
1. Matching models are now standard model of labor market dynamics; but
lots of recent controversy about their empirical success. One key issue:
matching models have a hard time generating as much cyclical volatility
in unemployment and vacancies as is observed in the data (Shimer 2004,
2005; Costain and Reiter2003; Hall 2003).
2. Broadly speaking, two general classes of mechanisms have been identi¯ed
which might help generate cyclical labor market volatility.
(a) One line of research, stemming from the papers mentioned above,
suggests that rigid wages may generate volatility. In these models
rigid wages create large °uctuations in pro¯ts which amplify the
°uctuations in job creation and unemployment.
i. However, only few papers have attempted to incorporate mi-
crofoundations for wage stickiness into the model (Shimer 2004;
Hall 2005; Shimer and Wright 2005), and it remains an open
question whether the quantitative e®ects of wage stickiness are
large when a consistent model of wage stickiness is used.
(b) A second (but earlier) line of research, initiated by work of Ramey
and Watson (1997), shows that incentive problems may amplify
°uctuations in job destruction. In these models of \contractual
fragility" or \ine±cient churning", the e®ort of agents is imperfectly
observable and small perturbations of productivity may eliminate
incentive compatibility, causing a wave of job destruction.
i. The merit of this second line of research is that it is based
on a coherent theory for the rigidity of wages. However, so
far the existing papers have focused on steady states, or the
transition path after a single shock from exogenously-imposed
initial conditions.
23. (a) In this paper, we study a matching model with incentive constraints
that lead to downward wage rigidity.
i. Like Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we study job creation
and job destruction in a matching model with aggregate and
match-speci¯c productivity shocks.
ii. But like Shapiro and Stiglitz (1988), we assume that wages
must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint that prevents
shirking.
(b) Thus our paper incorporates a microfounded form of real downward
wage rigidity.
i. Interesting to see how labor market °uctuations change when
a microfounded wage is used instead of an ad hoc sticky wage.
ii. In particular, since we assume labor productivity is cyclical but
the disutility of e®ort is not, our model implies worker's surplus
share may be higher in recessions. This suggests that it could
amplify the variation in ¯rms' hiring incentives.
(c) The incentive compatibility constraint also means that job matches
exhibit \contractual fragility".
i. Unlike Ramey and Watson (1997), Mortensen and Pissarides
(2001), and Jansen (2001), we will characterize the equilibrium
labor market dynamics.
ii. In particular, need to see whether large waves of ¯ring can occur
along the equilibrium path.
4. Combining the matching structure of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
with the \e±ciency wages" of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is not only in-
teresting for the light it sheds on the question of unemployment volatility.
Our model has potential to address several other prominent issues in re-
cent literature.
3(a) Using new data, Shimer and Hall have recently argued that °uctu-
ations in job creation are more important for explaining the move-
ment of unemployment, and °uctuations in job destruction are less
important, than was previously thought. The e®ects of downward
wage rigidity on job creation and the implications of \contractual
fragility" for job destruction means that our model has interesting
implications for both margins.
(b) One of the most robust stylized facts about the labor market is the
negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies (\Bev-
eridge curve"). But previous papers with time-varying job destruc-
tion (Cole and Rogerson, Mortensen and Pissarides, Costain and
Reiter, den Haan et.al.) have often found that the Beveridge curve
is delicate in the model.
(c) On the theoretical side, our paper helps to correct a misconception
about the dynamic properties of e±ciency wage models. In models
without matching frictions (Kimball, Kiley), it has been argued
that e±ciency wages serve to smooth the °ow of pro¯ts to the ¯rm,
by driving down the wage in periods when unemployment is high.
In a matching context, too, wages fall in recessions. But more
importantly, a negative aggregate shock makes it more likely that
the incentive compatibility constraint will bind, decreasing ¯rms'
share of surplus, and thus amplifying changes in ¯rms' pro¯ts.
5. Previewing our simulation results, the surprising lesson of our paper
is that this problem tends to smooth the cyclical °uctuations in job
destruction.
(a) Job fragility means that continuation value of marginal jobs is low.
Therefore it is very expensive for ¯rms to provide incentives in
marginal jobs during good times.
(b) Result may be that such marginal jobs are never formed.
4(c) Therefore economy never reaches state with large number of \fragile
jobs". Waves of ¯ring fail to occur. On the equilibrium path, \con-
tractual fratility" arguments fail; job destruction rate is constant.
6. On the other hand, fact that ¯rms' share of surplus rises in recessions
may increase volatility of hiring, and therefore of job creation.
(a) Overall e®ect of no-shirking constraint on unemployment volatil-
ity is ambiguous: it tends to smooth job destruction, but amplify
°uctuations in job creation.
(b) On the other hand, this result is consistent with recent claims that
unemployment variability is driven mostly by job creation, not by
job destruction.
(c) Fact that our model generates more °uctuations in job creation, and
less in job destruction, also helps our model generate a Beveridge
curve.
2 Model
This section presents a continuous-time, in¯nite horizon matching model with
imperfectly observable worker e®ort.
2.1 Preferences and production technology
Our economy is populated by a continuum of workers with measure normalized
to one. There is also a continuum of ¯rms; the number of ¯rms is in¯nitesimal
compared with the number of workers. All agents are risk-neutral and discount
the future at the common rate r.
Workers are identical and derive utility from consumption and leisure. The
instantaneous utility function of a worker is given by 1:
1This speci¯cation yields the same payo®s as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). More-
over, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Rocheteau (2000) use similar utility speci¯cations
to study the e®ects of working time reduction. For an analysis of labour supply decisions
with non-separable utility see Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
5U(c;n) = c + (1 ¡ n)b; (1)
where c denotes consumption, n 2 f0;1g is the fraction of time devoted to
work and b is the imputed value of leisure. Without loss of generality we
assume that workers consume their entire income at any moment. During
employment c is therefore equal to the worker's wage w. In addition, workers
can obtain a private gain from shirking that is assumed to be equal to the
leisure a worker would get from not going to work, b (this normalization is
also without loss of generality). Accordingly, we can write the °ow utility
of a worker who exerts e®ort as U(w;0) = w, while the utility of a worker
who shirks is U(w;1) = w + b. Unemployed workers, on the contrary, receive
no income and just enjoy leisure U(0;1) = b: Finally, the discounted lifetime
utility of a worker with income and working time paths fz(t);t 2 R+g and
fn(t);t 2 R+g equals
Z
R+ exp(¡rt)U[z(t);n(t)]dt: (2)
All ¯rms are identical and have a continuum of jobs that are either ¯lled
with a worker or vacant. Besides e®ort, the productivity of a ¯rm-worker pair
depends on two components: a match-speci¯c shock x and an aggregate shock
X that a®ects all ¯rms in the economy. Formally, the °ow output of a match,
denoted by y(x;X;n), satis¯es
y(x;X;n) =
(
y(x;X) if n = 1
0 otherwise. (3)
According to the above speci¯cation, ¯rms are a collection of independent
jobs. We assume that new idiosyncratic productivity shocks x arrive at Poisson
rate ¸. These shocks are i.i.d. draws from a distribution F with support [x;x].
Shocks to the aggregate state of productivity X arrive at rate ¹, and are drawn
from f1;2;:::Ng. The conditional probability that the current state changes














Here, column j represents the probabilities of the N possible states that could
follow state j, so each column sums to one.
2.2 Moral hazard
To introduce a shirking motive, we assume that ¯rms cannot perfectly monitor
individual e®ort. At any moment in time, the ¯rm observes total output, but
given that the ¯rm has a continuum of workers this does not reveal information
about the e®ort of individual workers.
Faced with this moral hazard problem, ¯rms o®er incentives by promising
to ¯re workers caught shirking. We assume that the ¯rm's participation in
the match causes it to observe worker's e®ort at the Poisson rate Á. Firing
observed shirkers (o® the equilibrium path) is an equilibrium strategy for the
¯rm if failing to do so would cause all workers to shirk. Shirking by all workers
(o® the equilibrium path) is an equilibrium strategy for the workers since
individual workers cannot demonstrate to the ¯rm that they are not shirking.2
In other words, an equilibrium within the ¯rm involving e®ort by all workers,
under a threat of ¯ring, is sustained by trigger strategies involving a jump to
a new equilibrium at that ¯rm involving shirking by all workers, and therefore
separation of all that ¯rm's matches.
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), equilibria of this form must satisfy an in-
centive compatibility constraint. This constraint, referred to as the no-shirking
condition (NSC), will act as a lower-bound on the outcomes during the wage
negotiations. In the remainder of this section we embed our version of the
shirking model into a matching model of unemployment.
2Assuming that the ¯rm is capable of monitoring more often, at a cost, equilibria with
monitoring rates higher than the exogenous rate Á might be sustainable. Such equilibria
would depend on workers' ability to observe or infer the ¯rm's monitoring rate. We will not
enter into these complications here.
72.3 Matching
Unemployed workers and ¯rms are matched together in pairs through an im-
perfect matching technology (e.g. Pissarides 2000). The gross rate of formation
of new matches mt is given by
mt = M(ut;vt) (4)
where ut is the number of unemployed workers, and vt is the number of va-
cancies open, at time t. We assume M exhibits constant returns to scale.
Therefore, the worker's probability of ¯nding a match, per unit of time, can





















so that p(µ) = µq(µ).
2.4 The value of matching
Before stating the Bellman equations for workers' and ¯rms' value functions,
we assume two restrictions on the equilibrium which are known to be valid
for related models (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Cole and Rogerson 1999).
First, we assume that aggregate jump variables may depend on the aggregate
productivity state X, and that match-speci¯c jump variables may depend on
x and X, but that neither may depend on other state variables, like the unem-
ployment rate or the distribution of idiosyncratic productivities across existing
jobs. We will see that the Bellman equations can be written in terms of x and
X only, so it is not unreasonable to conjecture that such a minimum-state equi-
librium exists. Second, we impose the reservation property. That is, we assume
there exists a vector of reservation productivities R(X) such that matches with
idiosyncratic productivity x continue in state X if and only if x ¸ R(X). In
8our numerical work, we prove by construction that equilibria of this form ex-
ist, although this does not rule out other types of equilibria. For notational
convenience, we will refer to the vector of reservation productivities as R, and
the continuation region as C(R). That is, a match continues if productivity
lies in the set C(R) ´ f(x;X) : x ¸ R(X)g.
We can now spell out the Bellman equations. Call the wage w(x;X), and
let the value functions of employed and unemployed workers be W(x;X) and
U(X), respectively. For any state (x;X) 2 C(R), function W must satisfy:
rW(x;X) = w(x;X)+± (U(X) ¡ W(x;X)) + ¸
"Z x
R(X)








GZX [W(x;Z) ¡ W(x;X)] +
X
Z:x<R(Z)





This equation states that the °ow of returns to matched worker includes the
wage, plus three °ows of expected capital losses and gains: the loss from ex-
ogenous separation, which occurs at rate ±; the gains from drawing a new
idiosyncratic shock z, at rate ¸; and the gains from switching to a new aggre-
gate state Z, drawn with conditional probability GZX, at rate ¹. Conditional
on an idiosyncratic shock, the separation probability is F (R(X)), and condi-
tional on an aggregate shock, separation occurs if the current idiosyncratic x
is less than the new reservation productivity, R(Z).
The unemployed obtain a constant °ow payo® of b from leisure and search
for jobs. Let µ(X) be labor market tightness, and suppose the rate of job
¯nding is p(µ(X)). Then for any X, the value of unemployment satis¯es:




GZX [U(Z) ¡ U(X)] (8)
where NW(X) is the worker's expected increase in value from a new job of-
fer (which need not necessarily be accepted), conditional on aggregate state
X. We will consider two cases. On one hand, we consider the case where
all new jobs are drawn from the top of the distribution, so that NW(X) =
9[W(x;X) ¡ U(X)], which guarantees acceptance. On the other hand, we
also consider the case where new jobs are drawn from the same produc-
tivity distribution that governs the idiosyncratic shocks, so that NW(X) =
R x
R(X) (W(z;X) ¡ U(X))dF(z). In this latter case, some new jobs are rejected,
and the value NW(X) re°ects this.
Now consider the value functions associated with vacancies, V (X), and
¯lled jobs, J (x;X). For any state (x;X) in the continuation region C(R), the
value of a ¯lled vacancy satis¯es:
rJ (x;X) = y (x;X)¡w(x;X)+± (V (X) ¡ J (x;X)) + ¸
"Z x
R(X)








GZX [J (x;Z) ¡ J (x;X)] +
X
Z:x<R(Z)





Thus the °ow of pro¯ts to the matched ¯rm consists of output minus wages,
plus three °ows of expected losses and gains analogous to those of the worker.
Next, suppose that maintaining a vacancy costs c per period, and that
vacancies are ¯lled at rate q (µ(X)). Then for each X, the value of a vacancy
must satisfy:




GZX [V (Z) ¡ V (X)] (10)
where NF(X) is a ¯rm's expected increase in value resulting from ¯nding a
possible match. If all new jobs come from the top of the productivity distri-
bution, then NF(X) = [J (x;X) ¡ V (X)]. On the other hand, if new jobs are
drawn from the same distribution F that governs idiosyncratic shocks, then
NF(X) =
R x
R(X) (J(z;X) ¡ V (X))dF(z), which includes the value of rejected
jobs.
Finally, we assume that ¯rms are free to open any number of vacancies.
Thus, in equilibrium, the value of a vacancy is zero in any aggregate state X:
V (X) = 0 (11)
but for the time being we prefer to clarify the structure of the equations by
showing V where it appears, rather than eliminating it.
102.5 Incentive compatibility
We are now in a position to derive the NSC. A worker will never shirk if the
gain from shirking during a short interval dt is less than the expected cost of
a disciplinary layo® in case the worker is detected. The logic also works in the
opposite direction. If it pays to shirk during a short period dt, then workers
will always choose this option.
Formally, let W s (x;X) denote the value function for a worker who shirks
during the interval dt. Assuming that the worker exerts e®ort during the rest
of the time the ¯rm-worker pair remains together, we obtain
rW












GZX [W (x;Z) ¡ W (x;X)] +
X
Z:x<R(Z)





where o(dt) signi¯es a quantity which becomes negligible compared to dt as
dt ! 0.
Comparing this equation to (7), dividing by dt and taking the limit as
dt ! 0, we ¯nd that the only di®erence between shirking and not shirking is
rW
s (x;X) ¡ rW (x;X) = b + Á(U (X) ¡ W (x;X)):
Hence, workers (weakly) prefer not to shirk as long as their match surplus
exceeds b=Á:




where b=Á is the expected gain in leisure (loss of e®ort) before the worker
is caught shirking.3 The above inequality acts as an incentive-compatibility
constraint that must be satis¯ed at all states (x;X) 2 C(R) since we rule out
temporary layo®s.
3Below we will use the variable Á to generate di®erent values for b=Á. This is why assum-
ing that the gain from shirking equals the value of unemployed leisure is just a notational
simpli¯cation that implies no loss of generality.
112.6 Wages and turnover
The contract of a worker stipulates a wage °ow w(x;X) that can be renego-
tiated after any shock. Other transfers that could alleviate the moral hazard
problem of workers, such as shirking penalties or bond payments, are ruled
out.
As is standard in the matching literature, we assume that the °ow wage
is determined through Nash bargaining. For any state (x;X), we de¯ne the
total surplus relative to the threat point of separation, as follows:
S (x;X) = W (x;X) ¡ U (X) + J (x;X) ¡ V (X) (14)
We assume that the worker receives fraction ¯ of this total surplus, unless the
incentive compatibility constraint binds, in which case the wage must rise until
the constraint is satis¯ed. (In the appendix, we derive these conditions from
a Nash bargaining game that determines the wage over a short interval dt.)
Thus, for states (x;X) in the continuation region C(R), the worker's surplus
is given by:
W(x;X) ¡ U(X) = maxf¯S(x;X);B=Ág (15)
and the ¯rm's surplus is
J(x;X) ¡ V (X) = minf(1 ¡ ¯)S(x;X);S(x;X) ¡ B=Ág (16)
Of course, the ¯rm also has the possibility of separating from the match. So
for any (x;X) 2 C(R), the ¯rm's surplus must satisfy
J(x;X) ¡ V (X) ¸ 0 (17)
which, together with (13), (14), and (16) implies that
S(x;X) ¸ B=© (18)
for (x;X) in the continuation region C(R).
Given that surplus is split according to the rules (15) and (16), (18) is both
a necessary and su±cient condition on total surplus S for the match to con-
tinue. Since workers and ¯rms are better o® separated outside the continuation
region, for (x;X) outside C(R) we can de¯ne
W(x;X) ¡ U(X) = J(x;X) ¡ V (X) = S(x;X) = 0 (19)
122.7 Privately optimal outcomes
In our economy separations correspond to layo®s. The ¯rms sever a relation-
ship when it is no longer pro¯table to pay the worker an incentive compatible
wage. Workers, on the contrary, base their e®ort decisions on their beliefs
about the duration of their job. From existing studies we know that this non-
cooperative choice of e®ort and reservation strategies may lead to multiple
Pareto rankable outcomes (Den Haan et al. 1999; Mortensen and Pissarides
1999). This multiplicity is due to a positive feedback between the reserva-
tion productivities and the minimum incentive-compatible wage chosen inside
a particular match, taking as given aggregate tightness. Intuitively, suppose a
worker anticipates an increase in the reservation productivity for the current
state. Given the shorter job duration, the worker needs a higher °ow wage in
order to exert e®ort, and given this increase in the wage °oor the ¯rm may
¯nd it pro¯table to ¯re at the higher reservation productivity.
Since a mutually bene¯cial deviation by the worker and ¯rm alone| with-
out any change in aggregate conditions| su±ces to eliminate multiplicity of
this kind, we think it makes sense to focus on contracts that are constrained
optimal for the ¯rm-worker pair. Thus, to rule out spurious job destruction, we
assume that the ¯rm and the worker have perfect and symmetric information
about the current state (x;X) and about the stochastic process over x and X.
This information allows them to choose the vector of reservation productivities
and e®ort decisions that maximize their joint value, subject only to the NSC.4
In the next section we will characterize these privately optimal outcomes.
3 Analysis
3.1 The match surplus equation
In this section, we will de¯ne equilibrium and propose an algorithm to compute
it. But ¯rst, we show how the model can be simpli¯ed in order to de¯ne
4For a thorough analysis of this problem, see Jansen (2001).
13the equilibrium concisely. Note that in the continuation region C(R), we can
simplify (7) by rewriting it as:
(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)W (x;X) = w(x;X)+±U(X)+¸
"Z x
R(X)













Therefore, an employed worker's surplus W (x;X) ¡ U (X) satis¯es
(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)(W (x;X) ¡ U (X)) = w(x;X)+¸
Z x
R(X)





GZX (W (x;Z) ¡ U(Z)) (20)
where we have used (8) to eliminate rU(X) on the right hand side. The surplus
of a ¯lled job is similar, but can be simpli¯ed further by setting V (X) = 0 for
all X:








Summing equations (20) and (21), we obtain:









This expression is fairly intuitive: we see that the surplus includes the °ow
payo® y minus the °ow payo® b associated with unemployment and minus the
gains that accrue to unemployed workers from ¯nding new jobs, plus capital
gains due to individual and aggregate shocks. Solving (22) is the main chal-
lenge to characterizing our model. We now characterize S and explain how
(22) can be solved.
143.2 Optimal time-consistent continuation
As we mentioned earlier, we assume that each worker-¯rm pair follows a con-
tinuation strategy that maximizes its joint surplus, subject to incentive com-
patibility. However, we must look at this issue in greater detail to be sure that
this assumption is well-de¯ned.
Since we are looking for a solution based on a reservation strategy, the N ag-
gregate states imply the existence of N reservation productivities fR1;:::RNg.
However, these need not all be distinct: some aggregate states could have the
same reservation productivity. For notational convenience, we will number the
reservation productivities, in backwards order, as
RN+1 · RN · ::: · R1 · R0
where we have also de¯ned the notation RN+1 ´ x and R0 ´ x. We can then
divide up the support [x;x] of the idiosyncratic shock into N + 1 intervals of
the form Ii ´ [Ri;Ri¡1). (If some of the reservation productivities are equal,
then some of the segments are empty. If we assume that all new jobs have the
best productivity, then the upper bound of the support should also be thought
of as a separate interval I0 ´ fxg. Otherwise, this point should be included in
the ¯rst interval, de¯ning I1 ´ [R1;x]).
If the worker-¯rm pair maximizes surplus, then this means they must never
separate when incentive compatibility is satis¯ed. This condition determines
the reservation productivities. Given aggregate economic conditions, which
from the pair's perspective are summarized by the vectors of tightness, µ,
and expected new job values, NW, guaranteeing incentive compatibility means
guaranteeing a su±ciently high surplus if the match continues. Thus, suppose
that the pair's surplus function is S and suppose that the pair expects to play
the reservation strategy R in the future. Then, using equation (22), the surplus
associated with continuation at any state (x;X) can be de¯ned as
T(x;X;S;R;µ;N
W) ´
















Joint e±ciency requires that the pair continue in state (x;X) as long as
T(x;X;S;R;µ;NW) is at least equal to b=Á. Therefore the reservation pro-
ductivities must satisfy a ¯xed-point relation of the following form:
R(X) = minfx : T(x;X;S;R;µ;N
W) ¸ b=Ág (24)
Surplus inside the continuation region must satisfy (22); outside, by de¯nition,
it is zero. This condition can also be written as a ¯xed-point relation in terms
of the function T:
S(x;X) =
(
T(x;X;S;R;µ;NW) for x ¸ R(X)
0 for x < R(X) (25)
Thus, given aggregate conditions, the matched pair's strategies must satisfy
the two ¯xed point relations (24) and (25). However, we have not yet shown
that our assumption| that there exist strategies which maximize the surplus|
makes sense. In other words, we have not ruled out the possibility that there
might be two ¯xed points of (24) and (25), one involving a higher surplus
at some states (x;X), while the other involves higher surplus at other states.
This would not only be a mathematical problem. Economically, it would make
it impossible to ¯nd a time-consistent vector of reservation productivities: for
some states (x;X) one reservation strategy would be preferred, and for other
states, a di®erent one. The following proposition shows that this problem does
not arise: in other words, given any aggregate conditions µ and NW, there
always exists a unique surplus-maximizing reservation strategy for the pair.
Proposition. For any aggregate conditions µ and NW, such that
y(¹ x;N)¡b > p(µ(N))NW(N), there exists a unique pair ¹ S and
R such that:
1. R solves (24) given surplus function ¹ S
2. ¹ S solves (25) given reservation vector R
163. If there exists another pair (S0;R0) that solve (24) and
(25), then R(X) · R0(X) and ¹ S(x;X) ¸ S0(x;X) for all
x and X.
Proof. This proof is based on the methods of Rustichini (1998). Note that
S0(x;X) = y(¹ x;N)=r is an upper bound to the true surplus function, and that
the vector R0 which has each element equal to x is a lower bound to the true
reservation productivity vector.
Note that if we de¯ne mappings from the right-hand sides to the left-hand
sides of (24) and (25), then these mappings are monotonic both in R and S.
That is, plugging a higher S into the right-hand sides of (24) and (25), we
obtain a lower new R and a higher new S. Likewise, plugging a higher R into
the right-hand sides of (24) and (25), we obtain a higher new R and a lower
new S.
Now de¯ne a sequence of functions Si and Ri by iterating on the right hand
sides of (24) and (25). Since the coe±cients on the integral and sum terms in T
are positive and less than one, we ¯nd immediately that S1(x;X) · S0(x;X)
at all (x;X), and therefore R1(X) ¸ R0(X) for all X. Since the mapping is
monotonic with respect to S and R, it furthermore follows that Si+1(x;X) ·
Si(x;X) at all (x;X) and Ri+1(X) ¸ Ri(X) for all X. However, the sequence
Si is bounded below by the constant function equal to zero, and the sequence
Ri is bounded above by the vector with all elements equal to ¹ x; therefore the
S and R sequences must converge. Call the limits of these sequences ¹ S and R;
by de¯nition, they are ¯xed points of (24) and (25).
Now suppose there exists another ¯xed point pair (S0;R0). Since S0 and
R0 are upper and lower bounds to all ¯xed points of (24) and (25), and since








and likewise, R1 is a lower bound for R0. Now by induction, Si and Ri bound
S0 and R0 for all i, and thus in the limit we have ¹ S(x;X) ¸ S0(x;X) for all x
and X and R(X) · R0(X) for all X.
Q.E.D.
The preceding proposition also helps us characterize the surplus function
and reservation productivities. Note that function S0 is weakly increasing in
x, and that the mapping (25) preserves this property. In fact, it maps weakly
increasing functions into functions that are strictly increasing in the continua-
tion interval. Function S0 is also weakly increasing in X, and it preserves this
property too under two conditions: ¯rst, the probabilities G exhibit ¯rst-order
stochastic dominance; and second:
y(x;X + 1) ¡ y(x;X) > p(µ(X + 1))N
W(X + 1) ¡ p(µ(X))N
W(X) (26)
17for all X 2 f1;2;:::N ¡ 1g. Since these properties are preserved by each step
of mapping (25), they also hold in the limit. Therefore we have proved the
following corollary.
Corollary. Suppose µ and NW satisfy y(¹ x;N)¡b > p(µ(N))NW(N)
and also satisfy (26), and that G exhibits ¯rst-order stochastic
dominance. Then the ¯xed point pair (S0;R0) of (24) and (25)
has the following properties:
1. Function ¹ S is strictly increasing in x for x ¸ R(X)
2. Function ¹ S is weakly increasing in X
3. The vector of reservation productivities R is weakly de-
creasing in X
From now on, we will assume that G exhibits ¯rst-order stochastic dom-
inance, and we will restrict attention to equilibria satisfying y(¹ x;N) ¡ b >
p(µ(N))NW(N) and(26), so that in equilibrium the reservation productiv-
ities are monotonic. Therefore the surplus function will be increasing in
both arguments, which immediately implies that the reservation productiv-
ities are decreasing. Hence, the N reservation productivities which we called
RN · RN¡1 · ::: · R1 correspond, in order, to the N aggregate states:
R(N) · R(NN¡1) · ::: · R(1). Thus we can use the notation RX inter-
changeably with R(X), and we know that on the (possibly empty) interval
Ii ´ [Ri;Ri¡1), all states X ¸ i will continue.
3.3 Characterizing the surplus function
We are now ready to describe in more detail what the solution to the surplus
equation (22) looks like.
3.3.1 Calculating the slope of the surplus function
Within the segments Ii, we can di®erentiate equation (22) to calculate the
slope of the surplus function (for each X) on that segment; we obtain













18Notice that this equation contains just one value of x. Therefore, the equa-
tions on any segment Ii can be solved independently from those on all other
segments, and the possible existence of empty segments is irrelevant for the
solution. Since the reservation productivities are monotonic in X, on any non-
empty segment Ii (27) constitutes a system of N +1¡i di®erential equations
in the N + 1 ¡ i unknowns
@S(x;X)
@x , for X ¸ i. The equations for segment Ii





































(Mi is the transpose of the last N +1¡i rows and columns of the matrix G.)
Thus, changes in S can be calculated explicitly on each segment Ii as long
as we choose a production function y(x;X) that can be integrated explicitly
with respect to the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks F. Similarly, we can
integrate the surplus functions W ¡ U and J segment by segment, with one
additional caveat: workers must receive surplus B=© when the incentive com-
patibility constraint binds. Given that S is strictly increasing, we can uniquely





for x < ^ x(X) and ¯S (x;X) >
B
Á
for x > ^ x(X) (29)
Thus the formula for the worker's surplus, and likewise that for the ¯rm's
surplus, will di®er depending on whether x is less or greater than ^ x(X). Note
that, as with our de¯nition of the reservation productivity R(X), the threshold
^ x(X) must be de¯ned by an inequality instead of an equation because the
surplus S has discontinuities.
193.3.2 Calculating the discontinuities in the surplus function
Now that we know how to integrate the surplus inside the segments [Ri;Ri¡1),
we must next ask what happens to the surplus at the endpoints of these seg-
ments. As the incentive compatibility constraint (18) shows, the surplus func-
tion need not be continuous at the reservation productivities. To be precise,
the jump in S(x;X) at x = Ri can be de¯ned as j(Ri;X) ´ limdx!0 S(Ri +
dx;X) ¡ S(Ri ¡ dx;X). If there is continuation in state X on both sides of
Ri, then equation (22) must hold in a neighborhood around Ri, and therefore
the jumps at Ri must satisfy




Thus the jumps at Ri are nonzero except in two possible cases. If there is
no incentive problem, so that S(Ri;i) = 0, then equation (30) is solved by
j(Ri;Z) = 0 for all Z. The jump would also be zero if GZX were zero for all
Z satisfying RZ · Ri.
So far, we have characterized the jumps in S(x;X) at points x strictly
inside the continuation interval [RX; ¹ x]; these points must be reservation pro-
ductivities Ri for other states i > X. However, since S(x;X) is zero outside of
[RX; ¹ x] and satis¯es (??) inside it, there must also be a jump of at least B=Á
at RX in state X.
As we saw earlier, the jump in S(x;X) at x = RX could in fact be strictly
greater than B=Á. Our analysis in section 3.2 shows that inequality (18)
can be seen as the de¯nition of a set of complementary slackness conditions
governing the reservation productivities R(X) and the corresponding surpluses
S(R(X);X). For any i 2 f2;3;:::Ng, monotonicity of the surplus implies:
Ri · Ri¡1




20The fact that the surplus is di®erentiable away from the reservation productiv-
ities implies that if dRi is strictly negative, then dSi must be zero. Therefore







´ dRidSi = 0
Notice therefore that we can now summarize the entire surplus function by a
vector of N numbers: ¯rst R1, and then for each i 2 f2;3;:::Ng, either dRi
or dSi. The two possible cases for these last N ¡ 1 numbers can be easily
distinguished, since dRi is necessarily nonpositive, while dSi is nonnegative.
3.4 Equilibrium
As we have seen, the surplus functions can be de¯ned in terms of the produc-
tivity pair (x;X) without reference to the current distribution of employment
and unemployment. Therefore, it su±ces to de¯ne (and calculate) an equilib-
rium in terms of the minimum state variable (x;X) before considering other
state variables. We therefore postpone for later the discussion of the dynamics
of unemployment.
Obviously this model has trivial equilibria in which workers always shirk,
and therefore ¯rms never hire them. But we are interested in no-shirking
equilibria in which the worker's surplus is su±ciently large to provide incen-
tives not to shirk. Summarizing the relationships discussed so far, such an
equilibrium can be de¯ned in terms of just four objects, S, R, µ, and NW.
De¯nition. A no-shirking equilibrium is a surplus function S(x;X),
a vector of reservation productivities R, a labor market tight-
ness vector µ, and a vector of new job values NW that satisfy
the following conditions:
1. For each X, the surplus function satis¯es the system of
di®erential equations (22) for all x 2 [R(X); ¹ x], and is
zero for x 2 [x;R(X)).
2. For each X, the surplus function satis¯es the boundary
condition (24) at the reservation productivity R(X).
213. If new jobs have productivity ¹ x, then labor market tight-
ness µ(X) and the new job value NW(X) are given by
c = q(µ(X))minfS(¹ x;X) ¡ B=Á;(1 ¡ ¯)S(¹ x;X)g (31)
N
W(X) = maxfB=Á;¯(¹ x;X)g (32)
4. Alternatively, if the productivity of new jobs is drawn from
distribution F, then labor market tightness µ(X) and the











3.5 An algorithm to calculate equilibrium
By now it should be clear that the main challenge in solving our model is
solving equation (22) to ¯nd the surplus function S. We only need to be sure
that this surplus function takes as given a tightness vector consistent with zero
pro¯ts on vacancy creation. We will now outline an algorithm for calculating
S, using the formulas for the slopes and discontinuities given in subsections
3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Once we ¯nd an S consistent with zero pro¯ts, the simulation
of employment and productivity dynamics is straightforward.
One approach to solving for S would be to use backwards induction, con-
ditional on a given µ. The results of Rustichini (1998) guarantee that this
converges to the correct solution of the worker and ¯rm's optimal reservation
strategy. But this could be extremely slow. Therefore, we propose a faster al-
gorithm, based on the fact that the entire surplus function can be summarized
by a single N-dimensional vector which we will call Q. We de¯ne
Q1 ´ R1 (35)
Qi ´ dRi ´ Ri ¡ Ri¡1 if Ri < Ri¡1 (36)
Qi ´ dSi ´ S(Ri);i) ¡ B=© if Ri = Ri¡1 (37)
22This de¯nition takes advantage of the complementary slackness relations that
govern the surplus at the reservation productivities. If (for i > 1) Qi is neg-
ative, then this indicates that Ri is strictly less than Ri¡1, and therefore that
S(Ri;i) = B=©. In this case, Qi ´ Ri ¡ Ri¡1. If (for i > 1) Qi is posi-
tive, then this indicates that Ri = Ri¡1, and in this case Qi equals the excess
jump S(Ri;i) ¡ B=© of the surplus function in state i. Qi = 0 indicates the
knife-edge case in which Ri = Ri¡1 and S(Ri;i) = B=©.
All equilibrium quantities can be constructed from Q. Given a candidate
value of Q, we can construct the surplus S and related objects, and check
whether the equilibrium relationships hold. Thus, instead of repeatedly solving
a dynamic programming problem for each value of µ, we solve a single N-
dimensional root-¯nding problem to calculate S, R, and µ simultaneously.
The steps are as follows.
1. Loop over aggregate states X from 1 to N, using the information in Q
to calculate RX and S(RX;X).
2. For each X from 1 to N, loop over other aggregate states Z from X to 1.
If RZ¡1 di®ers from RZ, solve the di®erential equations (28) to calculate
the increase in S on the interval IZ = [RZ;RZ¡1), and use the equations
(30) to calculate the jump in S(x;X) at x = RZ¡1.5
Given these two steps, we have constructed the surplus function S implied
by the vector Q. Note that it will be a strictly increasing function. Therefore
we can calculate the intervals over which the incentive compatibility constraint
binds:
3. Use equation (29) to calculate the cuto®s ^ x(X) for all X.
Next we calculate tightness in each state X:
4. Use equation (16) to calculate the ¯rm's value NF(X) of a new job in
state X, given the surplus function S.6
5If on the other hand RZ¡1 = RZ, it is super°uous but may be numerically helpful to solve
the di®erential equations (28) on the empty interval IZ and to set S(RZ¡1;X) = S(RZ;X).
6If new jobs have random productivity, this involves integrating the surplus function
J(x;X). Like S, it can be explicitly integrated, piecewise, given the function S, the reser-
vation productivities R, and the cuto®s ^ x.
235. Use equation (10), which reduces to the zero-pro¯t condition c = q(µ(X))NF(X),
to calculate the ¯rm's probability of job ¯nding q.
6. Use (6) to calculate labor market tightness µ(X).
7. Use equation (5) to calculate the worker's job ¯nding probability.
At this point, we know all the objects that appear in the surplus equation
(22). We can now check whether the complementary slackness conditions on
the surplus function are satis¯ed at the reservation productivities, given the
conjectured vector Q. Note that Q tells us directly the value of S(RX;X):
S(RX;X) =
(
B=© if Q(X) < 0
B=© + Q(X) if Q(X) ¸ 0 (38)
We can now check (for each X) whether (22) is satis¯ed at x = RX:









(Checking this equation involves integrating S(x;X), and will also involve
integrating W(x;X) if new jobs have random productivity. But this is no
problem since we know how to integrate them piecewise.)
If we ¯nd a vector Q that satis¯es (39), then we have found the equilibrium
surplus function. With it, we have also found the reservation productivities.
Given the reservation productivities, we can next simulate the dynamics of the
distribution of employment and productivity.
3.6 Employment dynamics
This is a heterogeneous agent model in which the state variable of the econ-
omy includes the full distribution of idiosyncratic productivities. Nonetheless,
the model can be explicitly solved in two steps. First, we have seen (as in
Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) that the equations de¯ning values, surpluses,
and labor market tightness can be written without reference to the unemploy-
ment rate or the distribution of idiosyncratic productivities. The characteriza-
tion of the surplus function in subsection 3.3 gives us su±cient information to
24solve for the surplus and all jump variables, including the reservation produc-
tivities, independently of employment. Once the reservation productivities are
known, we can then simulate the dynamics of employment and productivity.
To de¯ne these dynamics, note that new matches mt may or may not result
in employment. If all new matches o®er productivity x, then in equilibrium
such matches will never be rejected, so new jobs formed will equal mt. On
the other hand, if we assume that new matches are drawn from the same pro-
ductivity distribution as continuing matches, then when the current aggregate
state is Xt, only fraction 1 ¡ F(R(Xt)) of the new matches mt will result in
employment.
Next, to describe the dynamics of the distribution of employment produc-
tivity, we keep track of the mass of employment in each interval Ii ´ [Ri;Ri¡1)
separately. Jobs with productivity in [R1;x] are stable: they will not be de-
stroyed under any value of aggregate productivity. But when the current ag-
gregate shock is X ¸ 2, then there will be some other continuing jobs that are
fragile, because they can be destroyed when aggregate productivity decreases;
these jobs have individual productivity less than R1. Finally, any job that
receives an individual shock x < RN will be immediately destroyed under all
circumstances.
Suppose new jobs have the highest possible productivity, ¹ x. Let et (X) be
the measure of employed workers whose productivities lie in the set X. Thus
we can write the mass of new jobs as et (fxg), and the mass of jobs in any other
interval Ii, i 2 f1;2;:::Ng as et ([Ri;Ri¡1)). (The following notation is correct
even for empty intervals Ri = Ri¡1.) Let unemployment be ut, and total
employment be et ´ et ([RN;x]) ´ et (fxg) +
PN
i=1 et (Ii). Then the change in
the mass of individuals in each of these employment states over a short time
interval dt can be written as follows, dropping terms of order o(dt):
det (fxg) = p(µ(Xt))utdt ¡ (¸ + ±)et (fxg)dt (40)
det ([Ri;Ri¡1)) = 1(Xt+dt ¸ i)[¸(F(Ri) ¡ F(Ri¡1))et ¡ (¸ + ±)et ([Ri;Ri¡1))]dt ¡ 1(Xt+dt < i)et ([Ri;Ri¡1))
(41)
25dut = (± + ¸F(R(Xt+dt)))et ([R(Xt+dt);x])dt ¡ p(µ(Xt))utdt + 1(Xt+dt < Xt)et ([R(Xt);R(Xt+dt)))
(42)
It can be veri¯ed that these °ows sum to zero. Note that the terms 1(Xt+dt < i)et ([Ri;Ri¡1))
and 1(Xt+dt < Xt)et ([R(Xt);R(Xt+dt))) which appear as out°ows from frag-
ile employment and an in°ow to unemployment, are not of order dt. These
terms represent the spike of destruction of fragile jobs that occurs any time
the aggregate state X decreases.
Next, suppose new jobs are drawn from distribution F. Let et (X) be the
measure of employed workers whose productivities lie in the set X. Thus
we can write the mass of jobs in any other interval Ii, i 2 f1;2;:::Ng as
et ([Ri;Ri¡1)), de¯ning R0 ´ x. Let unemployment be ut, and total employ-
ment be et ´ et ([RN;x]) ´
PN
i=1 et (Ii). Then the change in the mass of
individuals in each of these employment states over a short time interval dt
can be written as follows, dropping terms of order o(dt):
det ([Ri;Ri¡1)) = 1(Xt+dt ¸ i)[(F(Ri) ¡ F(Ri¡1))(¸et + p(µ(Xt))ut) ¡ (¸ + ±)et ([Ri;Ri¡1))]dt
¡ 1(Xt+dt < i)et ([Ri;Ri¡1)) (43)
dut = (± + ¸F(R(Xt+dt)))et ([R(Xt+dt);x])dt ¡ (1 ¡ F(R(Xt+dt)))p(µ(Xt))utdt
+ 1(Xt+dt < Xt)et ([R(Xt);R(Xt+dt))) (44)
4 Intuition: two aggregate states
To illustrate the main features of the model we will solve the asset value
equations for a simple example with two aggregate states, called 1 and 2, that
correspond to recessions and booms, respectively. Suppose, for concreteness,
that F is uniform and that output is given by y (x;X) = x + ³X. Thus, the
surplus functions are linear upper semi-continuous functions. For moderate
values of b=Á (or equivalently large aggregate shocks), this example generates
counter-cyclical job destruction, i.e. R1 > R2. In booms some jobs survive
that are destroyed when the economy enters into a recession. On the contrary,
26when the moral hazard problem is severe, it is too costly for ¯rms to provide
incentives in fragile jobs and R1 = R2, resulting in acyclical job destruction.
For further simpli¯cation, we will assume that G12 = G21 = 1: that is,
any aggregate shock takes us to the opposite state, which means that the two
aggregate states each occur 50% of the time, on average. Finally, suppose that
new jobs start are the most productive jobs and that the support of F is wide
enough to ensure that job destruction takes place in both states.
4.1 Counter-cyclical job destruction
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if x < R(1)
Since job destruction condition occurs at a surplus value of b=Á in both states,
we can write the surplus functions as follows:
S(x;1) =
x ¡ R1
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for x ¸ R1 (47)
Inspection of (46) shows that output of fragile jobs is discounted at a higher
rate than the output of robust jobs that will survive during a recession. The
slope of the surplus function S (x;2) is therefore lower to the left of R1 than









27The above surplus functions are illustrated in ¯gure 1. Finally, using (11),
(9), and (16), we can write the free-entry condition on vacancies in terms of
the surplus of new jobs (x = 1) as:
c = q(µ(X))min
(





Similarly, evaluating surplus equation (14) at the reservation productivity
and substituting Ri = b=Á for i = 1;2, we ¯nd that job destruction in booms
is governed by
(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)
b
Á
= R2 + ³2 ¡ b + ¸
Z x
R2
S (z;2)dF(z) ¡ p(µ(2))N
W (2) (50)
because the marginal job does not survive if the cycle changes. In recessions,
on the contrary, the job destruction condition satis¯es:
(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)
b
Á
= R1 + ³1 ¡ b + ¸
Z x
R1
S (z;1)dF(z) + ¹S (R1;2) ¡ p(µ(1))N
W (1) (51)
where ¹S (R1;2) denotes the option value from the improvement in the pro-
ductivity of the marginal job if the economy inters into a boom.
The above conditions for job creation and job destruction de¯ne a set of
four equations in four unknowns, namely (µ1;µ2;R1;R2). Moreover, these con-
ditions con¯rm that job destruction decisions are driven by the NSC while job
creation decisions are either driven by the bargained wages w(x;X) or by the
minimum incentive compatible wages. In the latter case, the wage distribution
is degenerate since the NSC would bind on all jobs. Finally, if the NSC binds
on new jobs in recessions but not in booms, the surplus share of ¯rms is clearly
pro-cyclical. 7
7With stochastic initial match values this is always the case. Since S (x;X1) < S (x;X2),
in recessions the NSC will bind on a larger fraction of new jobs than in booms. For positive
values of b=Á the expected surplus share of ¯rms is therefore smaller than (1 ¡ ¯) even
though the wage distribution is not degenerate.
284.2 Acyclical job destruction
The case of acyclical job destruction is illustrated in ¯gure 2. Since S (R1;2) <
(¹=(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)) ¤ (b=Á), ¯rms cannot maintain fragile jobs because the
increase in the °ow wage needed to enduce e®ort would make the pro¯ts of the
¯rm negative. Hence, R1 = R2 = R and given that S (x;1) and S (x;2) have
the same slope we can write
S (x;2) = S (x;1) + j (R;2) (52)
The size of the jump j (R;2) can be determined using the surplus equations
associated with the case of acyclical job destruction:
(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)S (x;2) = x+³2¡rU (2)+¸
Z x
R
S (z;2)dF(z)+¹S (x;1) (53)
(r + ¸ + ¹ + ±)S (x;1) = x+³1¡rU (1)+¸
Z x
R
S (z;1)dF(z)+¹S (x;2) (54)
Subtracting (54) from (53), and using (52) to replace S (x;2) ¡ S (x;1) by
j (R;2), we get:
(r + ¸F (R) + ± + 2¹)j (R;2) = (³2 ¡ ³1) ¡ r(U (2) ¡ U (1)) (55)
The above equation de¯nes the jump as the appropriately discounted dif-
ference between the operating surplus x + ³X ¡ r(U (X)) in both periods.
This di®erence is increasing in the size of the aggregate shocks, ³2 ¡ ³1, and
decreasing in the frequency of aggregate shocks, ¹.
On the basis of the above solutions we can write the surplus functions as:
S (x;1) =
x ¡ R
r + ¸ + ¹ + ±
+ b=Á (56)
S (x;2) = S (x;1) + j (R;2) (57)
where j (R;2) satis¯es (55).
Together with job creation conditions (49) and the job destruction con-
dition for state 1 (condition 54 evaluated at R with S (R;1) = b=Á ) these
equations deliver a solution for µ1, µ2 and R.
295 Numerical results
In this section we present some (preliminary) numerical results for the case of
three aggregate states. The baseline parameters are shown in Table 1. The
model period corresponds to a quarter, the idiosyncratic shocks are uniformly
distributed and the relative bargaining strength of workers, ¯ is chosen to
satisfy Hosios' (1990) condition. The decentralized equilibrium with b=Á = 0
is therefore constrained e±cient.
Parameter Values
³X [¡0:053;0;0:053]









In Table 2 we present results for the case in which new jobs start with
the maximum value of the idiosyncratic shock x = 1: In the ¯rst column we
present the business cycle facts for the post-war period in the U.S. reported in
Shimer (2005). Comparing the data to the e±cient decentralized equilibrium
(Column 2), we see that the baseline model performs well in many respects.
In particular, our baseline model generates virtually the same coe±cient of
variation for the unemployment rate as observed in the U.S.. The level of the
average unemployment rate in the baseline model is 5:8% which is also close
to the U.S. average. The feature that is responsible for this high degree of
cyclical volatility in u is our choice of b. The value of leisure is equivalent to
90% of the initial match value in the intermediate state. As a result, the match
surplus is small and tiny variations in productivity generate large variations
in the surplus value and entry.
30Model
Coefficient of variation Data Efficient Low Medium High
u 0.188 0.1950 0.1620 0.1577 0.2283
v 0.183 0.0933 0.0952 0.1233 0.2670
y (x;X) 0.0306 0.0282 0.0282 0.0286 0.0290
w(x;X) 0.013 0.0265 0.0206 0.0180 0.0211
job creation (jc) 0.117 0.0979 0.0636 0.0414 0.0625
job destruction (jd) 0.197 0.2390 0.1639 0.1161 0.0575
Correlations
corr(u;y) -0.367 -0.877 -0.9015 -0.8995 -0.9146
corr(v;y) 0.362 0.6032 0.8581 0.9515 0.9717
corr(u;v) -0.896 -0.2274 -0.6135 -0.8075 -0.8212
corr(jc;jd) -0.65 0.3349 0.2327 0.1984 -0.0697
The next three columns report the results for di®erent values of b=Á: Low
(0.05), Medium (0.10) and High (0.15). The main variable of interest is the
coe±cient of variation for job destruction (Row 6). Inspection of Table 2 shows
that this variable decreases monotonically from a value of 0.2390 in the e±cient
outcome to 0.0575 in the case where b=Á = 0:15. These results con¯rm our
claim that moral hazard problems tend to smooth the cyclical °uctuations in
job destruction. Moving from Low to High, the reservation productivities in
all three states increase, but the increase is higher in the good aggregate state
than in the bad aggregate state.
On the contrary, the coe±cient of variation of job creation follows a non-
monotonic pattern. Initially, the introduction of moral hazard reduces the
values of jobs due to ine±cient separations. Moreover, this e®ect is stronger in
good states than in bad states because in relatively good states ¯rms are forced
to terminate some fragile jobs that do not survive after a negative productivity
shock. However, beyond b=Á = 0:10 we ¯nd the opposite result. When we move
from Medium to High, the coe±cient of variation of job creation increases from
0.0414 to 0.0625. The explanation is simple. In the last column the NSC is
binding on all jobs in a recession (³ = ¡0:053). In other words, in a recession
workers get a larger share of the surplus than in the remaining two states. As
31a result, the surplus share of jobs becomes pro-cyclical and this gives rise to
an increase in the cyclical volatility of job creation.
The above results for the variation in the pattern of job creation and job
destruction also explain the changes in the evolution of the coe±cient of vari-
ation of unemployment. As in the case of job creation, this variable follows a
U-shape pattern in b=Á.
Another feature of the model that deserves attention is the Beveridge curve
relation. In our benchmark model the negative correlation between u and
v is much smaller than in the data. But when we introduce a lowerbound
on the match surplus of 0.10 or 0.15 we observe that our model generates a
very realistic Beveridge curve relation. This feature is noteworthy because
models with endogenous job destruction typically face problems to generate
this feature. The failure of the standard matching model to produce a strong
Beveridge curve relation is due to the so-called "echo-problem". Since ¯rms
shed many workers in recessions, this is typically a good period to search
for a new worker. An increase in job destruction is therefore followed by a
strong increase in vacancy creation, leading to a positive rather than a negative
correlation between u and v. In our model this is not the case because the
ine±cient separations reduce the gains from job creation.8
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